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The Economics of Buying Complex Weapons 
Henry Ergas and Flavio Menezes   
efence procurement is an important current policy issue in Australia.  On 
one hand, there is a build-up in defence outlays as a result of the war on 
terrorism, our military’s involvement in peace missions in our region and 
beyond, and changes in the threats facing Australia.  Given the extra resources 
directed to defence, it is natural to expect that these expenses will be subjected to a 
greater degree of scrutiny.  On the other hand, greater public scrutiny also follows 
from a history of major delays and cost overruns in the Collins Class submarines 
and the Jindalee Operational Radar Network projects.  A recent media report (see 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/s1058425.htm) cites the findings of a 
review of the Government’s defence equipment projects by the Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute indicating a multi-billion dollar blow out in the cost of 
new defence equipment.  According to the media report, the costs of the Air 
Warfare Destroyers have doubled while the costs of the upgrade of the Chinook 
helicopter have more than tripled.   
In this paper we are concerned with the procurement of complex weapons 
systems.  We review the major characteristics of the weapons systems acquisition 
process that distinguish this process from a standard regulation problem.  We then 
discuss some of the outcomes of the acquisition process and focus on the 
relevance of the economic theory developed over the last twenty-five years for 
creating remedies to mitigate the intrinsic inefficiencies in the weapons systems 
acquisition process. 
Specifically, a weapons system is defined as a composite of equipment 
employed as an entity to accomplish a military mission (such as destroying enemy 
installations, identifying hostile aircraft, protecting advancing infantry or 
surveying territory).  Complex weapons systems, such as those associated with 
fighter aircraft and bombers, frigates and submarines, tanks and armoured 
personnel carriers, account for a high share of defence outlays in the more 
advanced economies.  The process of acquiring complex weapons systems 
encompasses their conception, development and production.  In this paper we 
focus on the efficiency of the acquisition process.  Efficiency in this context 
involves organising the process of acquiring each of those systems in a manner 
likely to maximise the systems’ net value.   
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The Nature of the Weapons Acquisition Process 
At first sight, the complex weapons acquisition process is simply a form of 
regulation: the government determines the price to cover producers’ costs and to 
guarantee that firms in the industry maintain an appropriate level of investment.  
However, the complex weapons acquisition process has a number of attributes that 
distinguish it from standard regulatory processes, for reasons we discuss below. 
There is an extent to which the difficulties that arise when purchasing 
complex weapon systems are common to many large civilian projects with long 
lead times and untested technologies, such as a new mine based on a new 
extraction technology (see, for example, Merrow, McDonwell and Arguden, 
1988).  However, in our view, the acquisition of complex weapons systems is in a 
category of its own in terms of the challenges it imposes given the nature and 
extent of the uncertainties, the fact that the buyer is the government and that there 
are several within-government incentive issues, the characteristics of the seller 
including the market structure in the industry, and the special characteristics of the 
contractual relationship between the buyer and the seller. 
The product 
Considered as a product, complex weapons systems are characterised by the 
substantial technical difficulties involved in their conception, development and 
production.  These difficulties arise mainly from three sources (Peck and Scherer, 
1962).  Firstly, bringing each system into operation involves a large number of 
distinct technical problems, associated with the large number of subsystems each 
such system involves.  Simply because of the sheer number of separate technical 
issues involved, the probability of encountering substantial problems in at least 
some aspects of the system must be high.  Secondly, the difficulties involved in 
solving each such problem are greatly complicated by the inter-dependence 
between technical issues, as the subsystems need to inter-work.  Finally, further 
constraints on system design and redesign arise from the need for reliability under 
highly challenging conditions.   
Peck and Scherer (1962) refer to internal uncertainty as that arising from the 
complexity of the technical issues involved in conceiving, developing and 
producing weapons systems.  They also refer to external uncertainties as those 
arising from a shift in the demand for a system resulting, for example, from a 
change in the geopolitical scenario that might result in a change in the nature of 
the external threat facing a nation. Given the very long lead times involved in 
weapons system procurement, these uncertainties in practice imply that it is not 
possible to fix the main parameters of a system — be it in terms of its outputs or in 
terms of its inputs — with any degree of precision prior to incurring what may be 
considerable outlays.   
It would be tempting, but often misleading, to think that these uncertainties 
can be resolved at the conception and development stage.  In the jargon of 
information economics, most weapons systems are ‘experience’ rather than 
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‘search’ goods — their attributes only become fully known in use.  As a result, the 
need for ongoing adaptation persists, so that system parameters generally change, 
in some cases very substantially, during the acquisition process. 
The need for adaptation is accentuated by the fact that because of weapons 
systems’ complex nature, long lead times are involved in the acquisition process 
— with 8 to 12 year lags being typical, and even longer lags being observed in 
individual cases (Peck and Scherer, 1962; Baron, 1993).  Additionally, weapons 
systems are typically long lived, with lifetimes that can extend over several 
decades.  The planning cycle for a system, covering the period from serious 
commitment to its acquisition through to the time of decommissioning, therefore 
spans many years. 
As circumstances will inevitably change over that period, including during 
the time of initial development, weapons systems are exposed to substantial risk of 
obsolescence, that is, of loss in value (in terms of their ability to accomplish their 
military mission) due to the appearance of superior alternatives.  Almost 
inevitably, responding to obsolescence involves allowing some degree of system 
redesign during development.  It also involves providing scope for refurbishment 
or modification during the system’s operating life.  The response to obsolescence 
therefore increases the extent to which weapons systems are evolving products 
that cannot be well specified in advance. 
The final characteristic that differentiates weapons systems from other 
regulated products refers to the relationship between the required substantial sunk 
costs and the nature of the risks faced by producers.  Although the precise 
outcomes from a weapons acquisition process cannot be readily determined in 
advance, substantial costs need to be incurred for a system to proceed to the 
production stage.  Usually, a very large share of these costs are specific to the 
system at issue and need to be sunk prior to volume production — ‘first costs’, are 
in other words, very high (first costs being the costs that need to be incurred to 
deliver the first unit of output).   
The buyer 
Unlike in the electricity, gas, telephony, transport or health sectors, the regulator 
and the buyer of weapons systems are the same agent.  This poses additional risks 
to the producers of weapons systems.  For example, governments are distinguished 
by their limited ability to commit.  In democratic systems such as Australia’s, 
governments face constraints on the degree to which they can bind future 
governments.  Even within the term of any given government, the annual nature of 
most budgetary processes reduces the scope for spending programs to be ‘locked 
in’, though governments have made greater provision for multi-year commitments 
in weapons procurement than in other areas of public expenditure. 
The difficulties the seller faces in predicting the behaviour of the buyer, and 
hence gauging the risk that behaviour creates, are accentuated by the fact that 
governments are not unitary actors.  Rather, the governmental process involves a 
range of players, from the armed services through to finance and treasury 
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departments and the legislature, whose views and interests will differ, and whose 
power may vary substantially over time.  The civilian-military relationship, in 
which the weapons acquisition process is embedded, involves all the complexities 
of principal-agent interaction, with extensive game playing (for example, between 
the armed services, their civilian controllers and treasury and finance departments) 
whose outcomes, as circumstances change, are often difficult to predict 
(Feaver, 2003).   
Rogerson (1994) uses the expression ‘incentives within government’ to refer 
to those incentive issues that arise from this complex relationship between the 
various government actors involved in the weapons acquisition process resulting 
from the need to delegate authority.  As Rogerson points out, unlike the 
relationship between the board of directors and a manager of a private firm, where 
there are objective (but imperfect) performance measures like profits and stock 
market value, there is no straightforward objective measure of the bureaucracy’s 
performance in weapons acquisition.   
Indeed, partly as a function of this ‘incentives within government’  problem, 
institutional change is a common event in most defence acquisition processes 
around the globe.  For example, in the Australian context, the government engaged 
Malcolm Kinnaird, Len Early and Bill Schofield in December 2002 to review the 
procurement process of major defence acquisitions.  This followed the creation of 
the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) in 2000 and a series of changes over 
the last three years.  The Kinnaird Report (Kinnaird, Early and Schofield, 2003) 
made a series of recommendations that were broadly accepted by the government.  
Perhaps the most significant recommendation is the establishment of the DMO as 
a prescribed agency financially separate from the Department of Defence.  Of 
course, the implementation of this separation will require the full development of a 
client-supplier relationship between the DMO and the defence forces.  The actual 
effects of this separation might take a few years to eventuate. 
In conclusion, notwithstanding the continued attempts at improving 
governance and at addressing the ‘incentives within government’ problem, even if 
a single fully rational buyer were to exist, inefficiencies would remain as the seller 
of weapons systems would still face a buyer who is a monopsonist and not fully 
capable of entering into credible pre-commitments.  Sellers are consequently 
exposed both to monopsony power and to the risk of the buyer acting 
opportunistically — that is, taking advantage of changing circumstances to 
increase its share of the benefits from supply. 
The seller 
Although there are many suppliers of weapons systems internationally, even the 
largest economies have only a few domestic firms capable of acting as prime 
contractors for major systems.  To the extent to which there is a requirement for 
domestic firms to play an important role in weapons programs, the range of 
competing sellers will be limited. 
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The extent of competition in supply is also limited by learning effects.  More 
specifically, experience, defined as previous participation in similar programs, 
appears to have a significant impact on supplier costs and capabilities (see, for 
example, Lorell, Sanders and Levaux, 1995).  Since few major systems of any 
given type are ever produced, the number of firms with the experience needed to 
be competitive is likely to be small.   
Additionally and perhaps even more importantly, within-program learning 
reduces the ability to shift suppliers in the course of a program.  To begin with, the 
original contractor usually has specialised know-how, skills and facilities acquired 
in the program’s early stages which can be duplicated by another firm only at the 
cost of considerable time and expense.  Moreover, reliance on concurrent 
performance of development and production work to reduce lead times generally 
requires a degree of organisational continuity, at least into the early stages of 
production contracts.  Once selected, the original contractor therefore faces limited 
competition in terms of subsequent supply and several studies (Peck and Scherer, 
1962; Fox, 1988) report that the US Department of Defence has been reluctant to 
terminate even very poorly performing contractors because of the high costs of 
shifting to new sources of supply.   
As well as facing limited competition, suppliers are to some extent shielded 
from full monitoring by buyers.  There is, in other words, scope for moral hazard, 
that is, for suppliers to act in ways which generate a benefit to the supplier which 
is less than the costs they impose on the buyer.  Under incomplete information, 
and even in the absence of moral hazard, it is well-known that the outcome of this 
‘bilateral monopoly’ game is inefficient (Chatterjee and Samuelson, 1983).  The 
moral hazard can take several forms, of which the most important are under-
investment in cost reduction, ‘scrimping’ on quality improvements which will 
reduce costs in periods in which the contractor does not bear cost responsibility 
(but increase costs subsequently), and an inadequate level of investment in, or 
disclosure of, innovations that are of net social value.   
In the jargon of principal-agent models (see generally, Bower, 1994), the 
scope for moral hazard in the weapons acquisition process arises from asymmetric 
information about costs and quality (information known to the seller but not the 
buyer about opportunities to reduce costs or improve quality) and limited cost and 
quality verifiability (constraints on the degree to which the buyer can ascertain the 
actual costs of the system or fully assess its quality at the time of delivery).  These 
features of the seller’s position then make a range of investments non-
contractable. 
As a result, the seller is usually in a position both to exercise some degree of 
market power (reflecting the constraints on competition) and having secured a 
contract, to act in ways inconsistent with joint value maximisation under that 
contract. 
As a practical matter, it is important to note that there is rarely, if ever, a 
single seller in a major weapons acquisition program.  Though programs will 
usually have a prime contractor, almost all major programs involve a myriad of 
distinct entities, including sub-system firms, overflow producers, parts suppliers 
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and makers of specialised materials.  The Collins Class submarine program, for 
example, involves over 1500 design and construction sub-contracts (The 
Australian National Audit Office, 1997).  These subcontractors were responsible 
for 80 per cent of the work associated with the program (Parliament of Australia, 
Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, 1999).  Further important 
difficulties arise from the fact that outcomes depend on the coordinated conduct of 
these entities, each of which experiences only part of the costs and benefits of its 
actions.   
The relation between the buyer and seller 
Because the buyer is essentially a monopsonist, and the seller (at least once the 
program is underway) has a degree of monopoly power, the governance of the 
relation between buyer and seller centres on the contract between them, rather than 
on any scope for each to turn from the other to alternative partners in exchange (as 
would happen in a competitive market).   
This primacy of bilateral governance, and hence of ‘voice’ relative to ‘exit’ as 
the main means of controlling performance and outcomes, is made all the more 
important but also more difficult by the need for each party to incur substantial 
costs specific to the program at issue and non-recoverable outside that program. 
The sheer length of time for which the parties are effectively ‘locked in’ to each 
other and hence for which the relationship must last only makes the contract 
between the parties all the more important. 
There are, however, substantial limits on how efficient the contract between 
the buyer and the seller can be as a means of governing their long-term 
interdependence.  In particular, given the uncertainty inherent in the nature of the 
product, the contract between the buyer and the seller is necessarily highly 
incomplete.  In practice, incompleteness is accentuated by the inability of the 
buyer to enter into fully credible commitments with respect to its future conduct, 
and by the difficulties involved in verifying contract performance. 
As contract incompleteness increases risk, it must, if left unchecked, increase 
costs and reduce contracting efficiency (see generally, Williamson, 1975).  
Contract incompleteness creates a risk of opportunistic conduct, in which parties, 
faced with changing circumstances, either threaten to ‘work to rule’ (thus reducing 
the aggregate value of the project) or as the price of accepting contractual 
modifications, seek to increase their share of any surplus from the project.  The 
Prescott-McIntosh review of the Collins Class submarine program instances this in 
a striking way.  It notes that since the program’s specifications were set in 1984: 
… technologies have changed, the region has changed and Defence’s 
ambitions for the boats have changed accordingly, but there has been no 
sensible mechanism for incorporating such changes into the contract 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 1999:14). 
Faced with this situation, the prime contractor, the Australian Submarine 
Corporation (Commonwealth of Australia, 1999:15): 
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… has no motivation to provide more than what it interprets as its 
contractual obligations, especially when the Commonwealth has 
established it will not pay more than the original contracted 
price...[However, the Project Office] acting on behalf of the Navy… is 
concerned that anything other than very minor amendments to the 
contract could let the prime contractor ‘off the hook’  and lead to 
substantial blow-outs in time and cost.   
Contract incompleteness also induces the parties to engage in what may be 
wasteful conduct to reduce the risk associated with renegotiation.  For example, 
parties might seek extensive and rigid rules, thus providing them with a degree of 
veto power over any change in the contract’s terms.  This merely exacerbates the 
difficulties involved in adjusting to changing circumstances, but it promises each 
party an increased ability to protect its interests when contract modifications need 
to be made.  This effect has been documented, for example, in the Collins Class 
submarine project (Parliament of Australia, Joint Committee of Public Accounts 
and Audit, 1999).   
Another frequently studied example of behaviour aimed at reducing the risk 
posed by contract incompleteness involves military buyers who engage sunk costs 
too quickly to lock governments into programs they might otherwise be tempted to 
terminate, or substantially scale back (Rogerson, 1993).  By front-loading costs, 
the armed services reduce the attractiveness to governments of program 
cancellation, since cancellations only allows few costs to be avoided and increase 
the political costs associated with cancellation, as in the event of cancellation, the 
funds so far expended will appear to have been entirely wasted.  Interestingly, in 
the Collins Class submarine project, as of 31 March 1999, Defence had spent 93 
per cent of the expected total project ‘for which there are five boats in the water, 
but none performing anywhere near adequately’ (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1999).   
In short, we can describe the relation between buyer and seller as a bilateral 
monopoly.  Thus, the governance of their interaction hinges on the contract that 
binds them, rather than on any scope to turn to alternative exchange opportunities 
(as would happen in a competitive market).  Given that the product required is 
difficult, if not impossible, to fully specify in advance, contracts are necessarily 
incomplete.  As a result, ongoing contract adaptation is required, but that 
adaptation increases the risk each party bears.  Parties anticipate that risk and seek 
to protect themselves from it, including by engaging in conduct which exacerbates 
the underlying problem.   
Perceived Outcomes 
An obvious difficulty that any assessment of the outcomes of the weapons 
acquisition process must address is that of defining performance.  Additionally, it 
is important to distinguish ex post assessment, which may be distorted by reliance 
on ‘20/20’ hindsight, from the evaluation of actions on an ex ante or interim basis.   
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In terms of assessing program outcomes, three dimensions seem most 
important.  First, the military value of a system depends on its quality, which may 
be described in terms of features such as its speed, destructive force or accuracy.  
Second, the value of a system also depends on the time at which and for which the 
system is available.  Third, the cost of a system, both at initial deployment and in 
terms of recurrent resource requirements, needs to be balanced against quality and 
timeliness.   
Successive evaluations of weapons acquisition programs have largely 
confirmed the early findings that programs tend to perform extremely poorly in 
terms of cost, moderately poorly in terms of timeliness and ultimately at least, 
relatively well in terms of quality (Peck and Scherer, 1962).  These outcomes are 
consistent with those observed in non-military projects of high technical 
sophistication: careful comparisons find that it is not easy to conclude that 
weapons programs perform ‘more poorly’ than their closest civilian and private 
sector counterparts (Peck and Scherer, 1962; Merrow, McDonwell and 
Arguden, 1988).  In both cases, large-scale, technically advanced, programs 
involve substantial cost over-runs and delays. 
That is, when technical difficulties are encountered, it seems that it is mainly 
cost that ‘gives’.  In other words, decision-makers, faced with the problems that 
inevitably arise, systematically tend to trade-off higher cost and somewhat delayed 
delivery so as to ensure that quality objectives are met. 
Consistent cost overruns seem consistent with a pattern in which there are 
soft budget constraints, that is, in which there is scope to renegotiate costs 
subsequent to the discovery of factors (most obviously, technical difficulties) that 
compromise the viability of the initial cost assessment (Maskin and Xu, 2001).  
The expectation that budget constraints are soft then has two consequences.   
The first is a tendency to systematically underestimate costs, most notably so 
as to advance the prospects of the program in its competition with other (military 
and non-military) uses of resources.  Weapons programs are of course, not alone 
in this respect — systematic under-estimation of costs has been observed in many 
areas of public administration (see, for example, Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl, 2002) 
and in those aspects of private sector activity where principal-agent problems are 
most acute.   
The second consequence of soft budget constraints is that suppliers, faced 
with costs that are underestimated to begin with, have less incentive to invest in 
cost reduction efforts.  In contrast, especially in mission-critical systems, failures 
to achieve intended quality likely will seriously harm supplier reputation, and 
hence considerable resources will be devoted to avoiding such failures from 
occurring. 
In summary, while some degree of cost uncertainty is inherent in technically 
complex programs, the extent and pattern of the cost variances observed in 
weapons programs suggest that it is not only random error in cost estimates that is 
at fault.  Rather, the presence of soft budget constraints has imparted a systematic 
direction to the error, inducing recurring cost overruns. 




At least since the mid-1960s, cost-plus contracts, allocated and/or implemented 
under conditions of limited competition, have been widely viewed as a central 
element in allowing the outcomes noted above to prevail (McNaugher, 1989).   
More specifically, in the absence of the disciplines (including through the 
scope for benchmarking performance) that come from competition, cost-plus 
contracts provide limited penalties for cost overruns, while also providing few 
rewards for aggressive cost containment.  To the extent to which the allowed rate 
of return under such a contract exceeds the supplier’s weighted average cost of 
capital, there will be incentives for cost padding, with the use of an input mix that 
is too capital intensive (the Averch-Johnson effect).  If capital intensity and system 
quality are correlated, there can also be ‘gold plating’; in the sense that quality will 
be over-provided. 
As a result, attempts at improving the efficiency of the weapons acquisition 
program have involved placing greater reliance on competition and/or moving 
away from cost reimbursement contracts.  Experience shows however, that there 
are severe limits to both of these remedies.  More recent reform efforts have 
therefore involved a more complex mix of measures.   
Competition  
In technologically dynamic industries, competition has both a rivalry effect and a 
portfolio effect.  The rivalry effect refers to the impact that the threat of being 
displaced or the prospect of displacing rivals has on suppliers’ incentives to 
perform.  The portfolio effect refers to the impact the concurrent conduct of a 
range of independent development efforts has on the probability of identifying, in 
a timely and cost-effective way, the optimal approach.  The extent of these effects, 
and of the net benefits that flow from them, depend both on the degree and on the 
type of competition.   
Competition can occur either ‘in the market’ — in the sense of involving 
concurrent supply by several independent firms — or ‘for the market’, through the 
competitive allocation of an exclusive contract to supply (as in franchise bidding 
for a natural monopoly).  This conventional kind of competition ‘in the market’  
cannot occur, at least on any substantial scale, for complex weapons systems 
because of the risk of ‘hold up’:  it would be highly risky for potential suppliers to 
engage substantial product development, testing and engineering prior to having 
obtained some degree of buyer support.  As a result, the ‘architectural’ issue 
buyers need to address is how many sellers they want to bring into the market for 
any particular system, and whether to retain the parallel presence of those sellers 
throughout the acquisition process or only for certain phase(s) in that process. 
Typically, the fixed costs involved in weapons acquisitions programs are 
high.  Full scale competition ‘in the market’ involves duplicating these fixed costs, 
which is often prohibitive.  This is all the more the case given that the gains which 
appear to come from weapons system competition in terms of greater supplier 
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‘keenness’ are not so great as to outweigh the cost penalty duplication entails (see, 
for example, Birkler, Dews and Large,1990; Pilling, 1989). 
As a result, full parallelism in supply (that is, the parallel presence of 
independent sellers throughout the acquisition process) has been very much the 
exception.  The most widespread form of procurement architecture uses parallel 
efforts in the earlier stages of acquisition (generally system development), with 
production then being allocated to a single source, perhaps through some kind of 
competitive bidding.   
In practice, however, such ‘design competitions’ can only work effectively 
where the fixed costs involved in design are not very large; where the know-how 
generated in the development phase is readily transferred between organisations; 
and where close integration, much less concurrency, isn’t needed between design 
and production.  These conditions are frequently not met.  Even when they are 
met, the extent to which ‘design competitions’ really exercise competitive 
disciplines must largely depend on how effective the subsequent competition ‘for 
the market’ proves to be, as it is the post-design stages that account for the bulk of 
costs.   
If competition ‘for the market’ is to be effective, there need to be at least two 
potential competitors.  This may not be the case in relatively small economies 
such as Australia’s if local content goals are being pursued.  Even if there are two 
or more competitors, competition ‘for the market’ brings its own distortions.  
Depending on the hardness of budget constraints and of contractual commitments 
more generally, firms will have incentives to ‘bid low’ (be it by understating costs 
or by overstating quality), with a view to subsequent contract renegotiation.  The 
fact that the winning tenderer will be the one that is most optimistic (about costs, 
timeliness and quality) adds a dimension of the ‘winner’s curse’ to the outcomes 
of the competition. 
These points imply that the efficiency of competition ‘for the market’ 
depends to a substantial extent on the efficiency of the contractual arrangements 
that will govern the relation between buyer and seller once the competition closes.  
If there are soft budget constraints, or if quality is non-verifiable (in whole or in 
part), competition ‘for the market’ will not remedy the poor outcomes noted above 
— indeed, it can make them more severe (for example, if it increases the 
incentives for cost and quality misstatement). 
This does not mean that competition ‘for the market’ is of no utility.  It can 
serve an important purpose as a means of soliciting seller investment in proposals.  
For example, the US Department of Defence uses a procedure where there is a 
competition at the design phase with the winner receiving some economic profits 
as a result of being awarded a sole source production contract.  Rogerson (1994) 
provides a discussion of the ‘prizes for innovation’ theory and practice.   
Additionally, where there are large numbers of potential suppliers, it provides 
a structured framework for supplier selection.  For example, the US General 
Accounting Office (1999) estimates that, by using competitive sourcing, the 
Department of Defence will have saved an estimated US$6 billion in the period 
1997-2003.  Moreover, when standard goods and services are being bought, the 
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sheer size of the defence forces means that it can use its monopsony power to 
extract more rents from the sellers via a more sophisticated auction design.  For 
example, the use of reverse auctions (the equivalent to an English auction in the 
procurement context) by the UK Ministry of Defence will make cost savings in 
excess of 65 per cent (about £750,000) when purchasing around 3 million packets 
of tissues (see http://www.ogcbuyingsolutions.gov.uk/information/releases/ 
release_200803.asp). 
Finally, when independent suppliers compete and the auction design is 
efficient, the prices they offer will pass back to the buyer any rents (in excess of 
the second lowest cost) that the suppliers could hope to make from the contractual 
imperfections — in other words, the gains from any post-contract supplier market 
power will be capitalised into the competing offers, effectively insuring the buyer 
against the exercise of that market power.  However, the inefficiencies associated 
with those contractual imperfections will persist. 
Considerable attention has been paid to the scope to retain some degree of 
potential competition ‘in the market’ even once the contract ‘for the market’ has 
been allocated.  More specifically, the threat of second-sourcing, of turning from 
the chosen supplier to an alternative, has been seen as a way of injecting 
continuing discipline into the supply process.  The circumstances in which the 
threat of second-sourcing is credible are relatively tightly defined.  It must be 
feasible to transfer some or all of supply to an alternative source, which may be 
extremely costly if substantial site- or supplier-specific fixed costs are involved in 
supply. 
The impact of the threat of second-sourcing is complex.  If there is substantial 
rivalry for the initial contract, any rents from contractual imperfections will be bid 
away, as they will be built into the offers made.  The threat of second sourcing 
merely increases the risk of opportunistic behaviour by the buyer and hence the 
initial bid price must rise (for given levels of quality and timeliness).  Thus,  
assuming effective competition for the initial contract, there cannot be an overall 
gain in efficiency (Anton and Yao, 1987; Riordan, 1993).  That is, overall, second-
sourcing is likely to make at most a relatively marginal contribution to the extent 
of competitive disciplines, at least in small markets like Australia’s. 
A further option for increasing the extent of competition is that of reducing 
the spacing between successive generations of weapons systems.  If new systems 
are developed while the prior generation still has some years of service potential 
remaining and the realistic option of having its service potential further extended, 
then there can be a degree of competition between the new system and its 
predecessor.  Obviously, this involves a willingness to bring system renewal 
forward in time, to enhance the degree to which the new system and its 
predecessor are effective substitutes.  In the context of the Collins Class submarine 
program, in contrast, the Oberon class was at a point where there was only one 
operational boat (Commonwealth of Australia, 1999). 
In short, competition, be it ‘in the market’ or ‘for the market’, is far from 
being a panacea.  High fixed costs impede the former.  As for the latter, its 
efficacy depends to a substantial degree on the efficiency of the contracts between 
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the buyer and the chosen seller.  To the extent to which these contracts are 
necessarily incomplete, competition for the right to be the chosen seller cannot 
resolve the distortions incomplete contracts give rise to, though it can limit the 
amount of excess seller profits these distortions might otherwise create. 
Cost reimbursement versus fixed-price contracts 
The move away from pure cost reimbursement contracts to contracts based on 
fixed prices is another important element in attempts to increase the efficiency of 
the weapons acquisition process.  Underpinning this move is the belief that pure 
cost reimbursement contracts create incentives for moral hazard, in the form of 
inducements to pad costs or to not invest to an optimal degree in efforts at cost 
reduction.  In contrast, fixed-price contracts will provide ‘high powered’ 
incentives for cost reduction, as the firm will retain any profits made by reducing 
costs.   
In practice, the incentives provided under fixed-price contracts may not in 
fact be as ‘high powered’ as all that.  There are two aspects to this.  The first arises 
when the information the firm generates in one period affects outcomes in 
subsequent periods — for example, when the price offered to the firm in 
subsequent periods is reduced in line with information about achieved cost 
reductions in the current period.  This ‘ratchet effect’ naturally dulls the firm’s 
incentive to achieve cost reductions.  The second and practically more important 
effect arises when adverse consequences eventuate — say when costs prove much 
higher than originally expected.  If governments are unwilling to allow supplier 
bankruptcy to occur, and a ‘bail out’ occurs, then the soft budget constraints will 
not in fact have been ‘hardened.’ 
However, even if it is assumed that the buyer can credibly commit to a fixed 
price, so that the cost-reduction incentives are indeed ‘high powered’, it does not 
follow that fixed-price contracts are efficient.  Three broad sets of argument are 
relevant here. 
The first is that fixed-price contracts may lead to an inefficient, and 
ultimately unsustainable, allocation of risk.  Imposing a fixed price shifts 
substantial risk on to the seller, without it being at all clear that the seller is best 
placed to manage that risk.  In effect, governments, with their ability to pool risk 
across many competing sources of income, will usually have greater options for 
efficient insurance than would be available to private suppliers.  If the risk is 
placed on the supplier, then a corresponding (and inefficiently high) risk premium 
will need to be built into the contract price.  Under these circumstances, reliance 
on fixed-price contracts will increase rather than reduce prices over the longer 
term. 
Second, a fixed-price contract may induce distortions in the allocation of 
effort.  The essence of the incentive provided by the fixed price is that the firm 
secures the entire return on investment in cost reduction.  However, other 
investments the firm might make are not equally rewarded and may not be 
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separately contractible or in fact contracted for.  The firm will then under-invest in 
these other aspects of performance. 
Third, fixed-price contracts generate their own forms of opportunistic 
behaviour.  The buyer under such a contract has strong incentives to exploit 
opportunities to increase the seller’s costs (subject to not driving the seller into 
liquidation), for example by interpreting product specifications in ways that shift 
costs onto the seller.  At the same time, particularly when adverse circumstances 
occur (for example, costs prove to be higher than expected), the seller has 
incentives to seek to escape from legal liability for supply. 
Like competition, fixed-price contracts are therefore no panacea.  They put a 
high value on apparent certainty in terms of the ‘headline cost’, but that certainty 
may well be obtained at the expense of considerable inefficiency. 
Other options 
Given the limits of the reform proposals set out above, attention has more recently 
focused on other options for making the acquisition process work better.  While 
these options are extremely diverse and to some degree overlapping, it is 
convenient to consider them under three broad headings: the ‘production function’ 
for system acquisition; contract design; and the wider environment for the 
weapons acquisition process. 
The production function 
As with other products, the weapons acquisition process involves a production 
function that relates inputs (the resources used in the process) to outputs (the 
goods and services obtained) (Peck and Scherer, 1962).  There are reasons to 
believe that acquisition processes have involved a degree of inefficiency both in 
terms of outputs and inputs. 
On the output side, there appears to have been a tendency, evident in projects 
such as the Collins Class submarine and the Jindalee Operational Radar Network, 
to seriously underestimate the cost of seeking high levels of technical 
sophistication.  It is well-known that costs, and the variance of costs around the 
expected cost level, rise rapidly with system complexity (see, for example, 
President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defence Management, 1986; 
McNaugher, 1989).  Specification of simpler systems, less loaded with complex 
requirements, could well allow substantial cost savings. 
On the input side, there is a longstanding concern about whether the 
appropriate level and mix of human capital is devoted to major system 
procurement (Peck and Scherer, 1962).  In particular, far greater investment is 
made in the technical aspects of weapons acquisition than to the management of 
the acquisition process itself.  Staffing of the commercial aspects of the acquisition 
process often involves significantly lower levels of skill (and correspondingly, 
pay) than seem sensible in view of the amounts at stake (Kelman, 2003; see also, 
in respect of the Collins Class submarine project, Parliament of Australia, Joint 
Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, 1999). 
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In short, less technically demanding projects, better staffed on the 
commercial side, could well allow for the better use of resources. 
Contract design 
There are recent trends towards using a hybrid approach to contract design (see, 
for example, Drezner and Leonard, 2002; Ingols and Brem, 1998; Lorell et al., 
2000).  These approaches have three common elements. 
First, target outputs are specified and suppliers are given greater control over 
the technical means by which those outputs are achieved.  This in turn requires 
extending the supplier’s responsibility to later phases in the product’s life cycle, to 
ensure that technical specifications are not chosen to shift costs from the 
production phase to the operating phase.   
Second, a phased approach is used for pricing.  In particular, the system 
development stage remains subject to a cost-reimbursement approach.  However, 
even during system development, suppliers are made aware of a price ceiling, 
beyond which the system at issue will not be procured.  This ‘must cost’ cap 
serves to render explicit (both to the system developers and to the community) the 
reservation price associated with the system’s expected military value.  If the cap 
is not met, the project is cancelled.  If the cap is met, then production price 
commitments are entered into for initial production lots.  These price 
commitments will reflect cost experience to date and anticipated rates of cost 
reduction (through learning or other scale effects).   
Price paths are also sought for production runs beyond the initial lots.  These 
price paths are not binding, in the sense that should the buyer seek to exercise the 
option to obtain these subsequent lots at that price, the seller may at that stage seek 
a different price.  However, the buyer then has the option of securing supply from 
the seller on a cost-reimbursement basis.  In other words, the buyer has a call 
option either to buy at the bid price or to buy at the cost-reimbursement price.  The 
seller, on the other hand, is not assured of a put option symmetrical to the rights 
vested in the buyer, but is assured that if the buyer does procure units subsequent 
to the initial lots, the price for those units will not be lower than specified in the 
seller’s successful non-binding bid.  Separately, incentive payments are provided 
if the system’s performance exceeds expectations. 
Third, greater weight is placed in seller selection on sellers’ past 
performance.  This allows suppliers to secure an explicit return on investment in 
reputation and helps convert the acquisition process into a repeated game.  Sellers 
are thereby discouraged from engaging in short-term, opportunistic, conduct, as 
the penalties associated with that conduct are increased. 
The context in which acquisition occurs 
Finally, increased attention has been paid to shaping the context in which 
acquisition occurs.  This perhaps inevitably involves a range of relatively ‘soft’ 
variables, only some of which have been studied in a formal way by economists.  
Two such variables stand out. 
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The first is trust, or what might be more broadly referred to as the social 
context of the procurement relationship.  It is known that such contractual 
incompleteness might be least distorting when agents share a broad understanding 
of goals and of the norms that are acceptable in achieving those goals (see 
especially Kreps, 1990).  This is because the shared norms and goals reduce the 
risk of opportunism, and hence the risk loading that affects product costs, and 
facilitates mutual adjustment to changing circumstances.  For example, the costs 
of major nuclear programs appear to have been significantly lower in France, 
where institutional arrangements make for common socialisation of defence 
buyers and suppliers, than in the US or the UK (see, for example, Kolodziej, 
1987).   
It is not easy to identify policies that materially affect the relevant dimensions 
of trust and that are meaningfully within the control of acquisition authorities.  
However, there are reasons to believe that competition tends to undermine a 
perception of shared goals and norms.  Most simply put, in a competitive 
environment, suppliers may have stronger incentives to act opportunistically, since 
they have less assurance that passing up opportunities for short-term gain will 
yield long-term rewards.  Moreover, supplier investments in reputational capital 
may need to be written off if their relationship with the buyer comes to an end.  As 
a result, there is a tension between subjecting suppliers to competitive pressures 
and seeking from them types of behaviour more commonly found in repeated 
games.  Clearly, placing greater weight on past supplier performance as a criterion 
in supplier selection is one way of attempting to ease this tension. 
A second dimension of the context in which acquisition occurs is monitoring.  
Systematic project and program evaluation by authoritative independent parties 
can serve a range of important functions.  These include facilitating conflict 
resolution by acting as a neutral evaluator of conflicting claims; improving 
accountability and hence increasing the pressure for good performance; and 
drawing the lessons from acquisition experience in a timely and rigorous manner, 
hence allowing both more and less promising approaches to be identified sooner 
and more effectively. 
An obvious example is the important role the Federally Funded Research and 
Development Corporations play in the US, and most notably RAND, the Institute 
for Defence Analysis and the Centre for Naval Analyses (Defence Science Board 
Task Force, 1997).  RAND in particular has pioneered economic analysis of 
acquisitions programs and continues to act as an important source of rigorous 
research in this area.   
In his study of major British procurement failures, Henderson (1977) stressed 
the role that the lack of transparent, early evaluation and accountability played in 
ensuring ‘the unimportance of being right’ — that is, the absence of rewards for 
successful decision-making and of penalties for poor decision-making.  In 
Australia, while it is true that the Audit Office has been of obvious importance in 
highlighting performance issues in programs such as the Collins Class submarines 
and the Jindalee Operational Radar Network, no systematic, economic, evaluation 
of programs is carried out independently from the buyer.  Additionally, past 
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reports aimed at drawing more systematic assessments — most notably the then 
Industry Commission’s review of defence procurement (Industry Commission, 
1994) — are outdated and did not go deeply into the economic issues involved.  
Thus, a greater emphasis on an independent systematic economic evaluation of 
weapons systems acquisition programs has the potential to yield some gains in 
terms of program effectiveness.   
Conclusions 
The complex weapons acquisition process is afflicted by almost al of the 
pathologies that prevent efficient outcomes: information asymmetry, conflicting 
goals, non-commensurable objectives, lack of credible commitments, within 
government incentive problems, all superimposed with a high degree of technical 
complexity and uncertainty.  Developing a proper diagnosis of the reasons for the 
necessary imperfections associated with purchasing complex weapons systems is 
important, as it can help us to understand both the limits and the potential of 
reform proposals. 
Several lessons can be drawn from the discussion above.  Firstly, competition 
(either ‘in the market’ or ‘for the market’) and fixed-price contracts are useful 
tools but they will not result, by themselves, in efficient outcomes.  Secondly, 
there seems to be scope for hybrid contracts, involving both cost-plus and fixed-
price elements.  One of the most important lessons arising from the economics of 
designing auctions and tender processes is that the details matter.  This suggests 
that ‘one-size-fits-all’ approaches to procuring complex weapons systems are 
destined to fail and, instead, the ‘right’ hybrid contract has to be designed on a 
case-by-case basis.  Finally, greater emphasis should be placed on addressing the 
incentives within government issue — and the financial separation of the DMO 
from the Department of Defence is a step in the right direction — and on 
encouraging independent and systematic economic evaluation of the complex 
weapons acquisition process.   
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